Research Catalog
Reliable inspection strategies : a game theoretic analysis of sampling inspection : problems arising in the context of the non-proliferation treaty and market leadership / Eckhard Höpfinger.
- Title
- Reliable inspection strategies : a game theoretic analysis of sampling inspection : problems arising in the context of the non-proliferation treaty and market leadership / Eckhard Höpfinger.
- Author
- Höpfinger, Eckhard.
- Publication
- Meisenheim (am Glan) : Hain, 1975.
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Status | Format | Access | Call Number | Item Location |
---|---|---|---|---|
Text | Request in advance | JLD 77-1802 | Offsite |
Details
- Description
- 66 p. : 2 ill.; 23 cm.
- Series Statement
- Mathematical systems in economics, 17
- Subject
- Bibliography (note)
- Bibliography: p. 65-66.
- Call Number
- JLD 77-1802
- ISBN
- 3445012571
- LCCN
- 76353220
- OCLC
- 2073140
- NYPG774399678-B
- Author
- Höpfinger, Eckhard.
- Title
- Reliable inspection strategies : a game theoretic analysis of sampling inspection : problems arising in the context of the non-proliferation treaty and market leadership / Eckhard Höpfinger.
- Imprint
- Meisenheim (am Glan) : Hain, 1975.
- Series
- Mathematical systems in economics, 17
- Bibliography
- Bibliography: p. 65-66.
- Research Call Number
- JLD 77-1802