Research Catalog

Reliable inspection strategies : a game theoretic analysis of sampling inspection : problems arising in the context of the non-proliferation treaty and market leadership / Eckhard Höpfinger.

Title
Reliable inspection strategies : a game theoretic analysis of sampling inspection : problems arising in the context of the non-proliferation treaty and market leadership / Eckhard Höpfinger.
Author
Höpfinger, Eckhard.
Publication
Meisenheim (am Glan) : Hain, 1975.

Items in the Library & Off-site

Filter by

1 Item

StatusFormatAccessCall NumberItem Location
TextRequest in advance JLD 77-1802Offsite

Details

Description
66 p. : 2 ill.; 23 cm.
Series Statement
Mathematical systems in economics, 17
Subject
  • Disarmament > On-site inspection > Mathematical models
  • Marketing > Mathematical models
  • Game theory
Bibliography (note)
  • Bibliography: p. 65-66.
Call Number
JLD 77-1802
ISBN
3445012571
LCCN
76353220
OCLC
  • 2073140
  • NYPG774399678-B
Author
Höpfinger, Eckhard.
Title
Reliable inspection strategies : a game theoretic analysis of sampling inspection : problems arising in the context of the non-proliferation treaty and market leadership / Eckhard Höpfinger.
Imprint
Meisenheim (am Glan) : Hain, 1975.
Series
Mathematical systems in economics, 17
Bibliography
Bibliography: p. 65-66.
Research Call Number
JLD 77-1802
View in Legacy Catalog