- Description
- 1 online resource (xiii, 220 pages)
- Uniform Title
- Breakdown in Pakistan (Online)
- Alternative Title
- Breakdown in Pakistan (Online)
- Subject
- Bibliography (note)
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 189-206) and index.
- Access (note)
- Access restricted to authorized users.
- Contents
- Revisiting the collective action dilemma -- Intrinsic or extrinsic incentives : the evolution of cooperative groups in Pakistan -- Why cooperate? : motives and decisions of initiators and joiners in other-regarding groups -- Why cooperate? : motives and decisions of initiators and joiners in self-regarding groups -- Does aid break down cooperation? -- Why aid breaks down cooperation -- Fixing incentives : the way forward.
- LCCN
- 2011051605
- OCLC
- ssj0000632837
- Author
Bano, Masooda.
- Title
Breakdown in Pakistan [electronic resource] : how aid is eroding institutions for collective action / Masooda Bano.
- Imprint
Stanford, California : Stanford Economics and Finance, an imprint of Stanford University Press, [2012].
- Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 189-206) and index.
- Access
Access restricted to authorized users.
- Connect to: