- Additional Authors
- Pinero Campos, José Maria.
- Description
- 49 p.; 21 x 29.7cm.
- Summary
- Sub-central tax competition is the strategic interaction of tax policy between jurisdictions with the objective to attract and retain mobile tax bases. The views on tax competition differ widely: while some consider that tax competition brings sub-central fiscal policy closer to citizen?s preferences, increases the efficiency of the public sector and avoids tax and spending excesses, others argue that tax competition leads to a distorted tax structure, to growing tax rate disparities and to an under-provision of public services. The main conclusions of the paper are: tax competition is stronger on mobile taxes (corporate and personal income tax) than on immobile taxes (property tax, consumption taxes); tax rates tend to be lower in wealthier jurisdictions; there is little evidence of a "race to the bottom" with respect to tax rates and tax revenues; and inter-jurisdictional differences in tax raising capacity – or economic wealth – appear to be lower in countries with more tax competition. Governments considering tax competition "excessive" may introduce or amend fiscal equalisation; increase sub-central property taxation and reduce other sub-central taxes; or harmonise the tax bases of sub-central governments to some extent.
- Series Statement
- OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 1815-1973 ; no.872
- Uniform Title
- OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no.872.
- Subject
- Economics
- LCCN
- 10.1787/5kgb1mfm6jnw-en
- OCLC
- oecd-lib-004437
- Author
Blöchliger, Hansjörg.
- Title
Tax Competition Between Sub-Central Governments [electronic resource] / Hansjörg Blöchliger and José Maria Pinero Campos
- Imprint
Paris : OECD Publishing, 2011.
- Series
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 1815-1973 ; no.872
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 1815-1973 ; no.872.
- Connect to:
- Indexed Term
Economics
- Added Author
Pinero Campos, José Maria.
- Other Standard Identifier
10.1787/5kgb1mfm6jnw-en doi