Research Catalog

Partisan balance : why political parties don't kill the U.S. Constitutional system

Title
Partisan balance : why political parties don't kill the U.S. Constitutional system / David R. Mayhew.
Author
Mayhew, David R.
Publication
Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2011.

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TextUse in library JFE 15-6973Schwarzman Building - Main Reading Room 315

Details

Description
xx, 220 pages : illustrations; 24 cm
Summary
From the publisher. With three independent branches, a legislature divided into two houses, and many diverse constituencies, it is remarkable that the federal government does not collapse in permanent deadlock. Yet, this system of government has functioned for well over two centuries, even through such heated partisan conflicts as the national health-care showdown and Supreme Court nominations. Mayhew examines the unique electoral foundations of the presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives in order to provide a fresh understanding for the government's success and longstanding vitality. Focusing on the period after World War II, and the fate of legislative proposals offered by presidents from Harry Truman to George W. Bush, Mayhew reveals that the presidency, Senate, and House rest on surprisingly similar electoral bases, with little difference in their partisan textures as indexed by the presidential popular vote cast in the various constituencies. Both congressional chambers have tilted a bit Republican, and while White House legislative initiatives have fared accordingly, Mayhew shows that presidents have done relatively well in getting their major proposals enacted. Over the long haul, the Senate has not proven much more of a stumbling block than the House. Arguing that the system has developed a self-correcting impulse that leads each branch to pull back when it deviates too much from other branches, Mayhew contends that majoritarianism largely characterizes the American system. The wishes of the majority tend to nudge institutions back toward the median voter, as in the instances of legislative districting, House procedural reforms, and term limits for presidents and legislators.
Series Statement
Princeton lectures in politics and public affairs
Uniform Title
Princeton lectures in politics and public affairs.
Subjects
Bibliography (note)
  • Includes bibliographical references (pages 191-214) and index.
Contents
The electoral bases -- President and Congress -- House and Senate I -- House and Senate II -- Reform -- Appendix : sources for Presidential proposals.
Call Number
JFE 15-6973
ISBN
  • 9780691144658 (acid-free paper)
  • 0691144656 (acid-free paper)
  • 9781400838417 (e-book)
  • 140083841X (e-book)
LCCN
2010044113
OCLC
670248563
Author
Mayhew, David R.
Title
Partisan balance : why political parties don't kill the U.S. Constitutional system / David R. Mayhew.
Imprint
Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2011.
Type of Content
text
Type of Medium
unmediated
Type of Carrier
volume
Series
Princeton lectures in politics and public affairs
Princeton lectures in politics and public affairs.
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 191-214) and index.
Research Call Number
JFE 15-6973
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