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Free will and action explanation : a non-causal, compatibilist account

Title
Free will and action explanation : a non-causal, compatibilist account / Scott Sehon.
Author
Sehon, Scott Robert, 1963-
Publication
  • Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.
  • ©2016

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TextUse in library JFE 16-9471Schwarzman Building - Main Reading Room 315

Details

Description
xii, 239 pages; 24 cm
Summary
Do we have free will and moral responsibility? Is free will compatible with determinism? Scott Sehon argues that we can make progress on these questions by focusing on an underlying issue: the nature of action explanation. Part I of the book proposes and defends a non-causal account of action and agency, according to which reason explanation of human behavior is irreducibly teleological rather than causal. Part II applies the teleological account of action to free will and responsibility, arguing that the free actions-the ones for which we are directly responsible. It is then argued that this non-causal account of action undermines the appeal of incompatibilist arguments, arguments attempting to show that free will is not compatible with determinism.0Beyond this, Sehon argues that the non-causal compatibilist account works well in practice: it is in accord with our clear intuitions about cases, and it both explains and provides guidance in the cases where our intuitions are murkier.
Subject
  • Free will and determinism
  • Explanation
Bibliography (note)
  • Includes bibliographical references and index.
Call Number
JFE 16-9471
ISBN
  • 9780198758495
  • 0198758499
OCLC
951844617
Author
Sehon, Scott Robert, 1963- author.
Title
Free will and action explanation : a non-causal, compatibilist account / Scott Sehon.
Publisher
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.
Copyright Date
©2016
Edition
First edition.
Type of Content
text
Type of Medium
unmediated
Type of Carrier
volume
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Research Call Number
JFE 16-9471
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