- Description
- 1 online resource (x, 329 pages)
- Summary
- The Euro-Crisis and the legal and institutional responses to it have had important constitutional implications on the architecture of the European Union (EU). Going beyond the existing literature, Federico Fabbrini's book takes a broad look and examines how the crisis and its aftermath have changed relations of power in the EU, disaggregating three different dimensions: (1) the vertical relations of power between the member states and the EU institutions, (2) the relations of power between the political branches and the courts, and (3) the horizontal relations of power between the EU member states themselves. The first part of the book argues that, in the aftermath of the Euro-crisis, power has been shifting along each of these axes in paradoxical ways. In particular, through a comparison of the United States, Fabbrini reveals that the EU is nowadays characterized by a high degree of centralization in budgetary affairs, an unprecedented level of judicialization of economic questions, and a growing imbalance between the member states in the governance of fiscal matters. As the book makes clear, however, each of these dynamics is a cause for concern - as it calls into question important constitutional values for the EU, such as the autonomy of the member states in taking decision about taxing and spending, the preeminence of the political process in settling economic matters, and the balance between state power and state equality. The second part of the book, therefore, devises possible options for future legal and institutional developments in the EU which may revert these paradoxical trends. In particular, Fabbrini considers the ideas of raising a fiscal capacity, restoring the centrality of the EU legislative process, and reforming the EU executive power, and discusses the challenges that accompany any further step towards a deeper Economic and Monetary Union.--Provided by publisher.
- Series Statement
- Oxford studies in European law
- Uniform Title
- Economic governance in Europe (Online)
- Oxford studies in European law.
- Alternative Title
- Economic governance in Europe (Online)
- Subject
- Note
- "The author's primary purpose is to access how the euro-crisis and the responses thereto have changed the constitutional architecutre of economic governance in Europe"--Page v.
- Bibliography (note)
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 291-318) and index.
- Access (note)
- Access restricted to authorized users.
- Contents
- Introduction: The new constitutional architecture of European governance -- Part I. Accident and force. 1. The paradox of centralization -- 2. The paradox of judicialization -- 3. The paradox of domination -- Part II. Reflection and choice. 4. From fiscal constraints to fiscal capacity -- 5. From legislative side-lining to legislative involvement -- 6. From executive federalism to executive government -- Conclusion: For a "more perfect" economic and monetary union.
- LCCN
- 2015959803
- OCLC
- ssj0001681626
- Author
Fabbrini, Federico, 1985-
- Title
Economic governance in Europe [electronic resource] : comparative paradoxes and constitutional challenges / Federico Fabbrini.
- Imprint
Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Edition
First edition.
- Series
Oxford studies in European law
Oxford studies in European law.
- Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 291-318) and index.
- Access
Access restricted to authorized users.
- Connect to:
- Chronological Term
2008-2009