- Description
- 1 online resource (xviii, 274 pages) : illustrations.
- Summary
- "This book explores linguistic and philosophical issues presented by sentences expressing personal taste, such as Roller coasters are fun, or Licorice is tasty. Standard semantic theories explain the meanings of sentences by specifying the conditions under which they are true; here, Peter Lasersohn asks how we can account for sentences that are concerned with matters of opinion rather than matters of fact. He argues that a truth-theoretic semantic theory is appropriate even for sentences like these, but that for such sentences, truth and falsity must be assigned relative to perspectives, rather than absolutely. The book provides a detailed and explicit formal grammar, working out the implications of this conception of truth both for simple sentences and for reports of mental attitude. The semantic analysis is paired with a pragmatic theory explaining what it means to assert a sentence which is true or false only relativistically, and with a speculative account of the functional motivation for a relativized notion of truth."--
- Series Statement
- Oxford studies in semantics and pragmatics ; 8
- Uniform Title
- Subjectivity and perspective in truth-theoretic semantics (Online)
- Oxford studies in semantics and pragmatics ; 8.
- Alternative Title
- Subjectivity and perspective in truth-theoretic semantics (Online)
- Subject
- Bibliography (note)
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 259-266) and index.
- Access (note)
- Access restricted to authorized users.
- Contents
- Machine generated contents note: 1. Subjectivity, disagreement, and content -- 1.1. goal: a truth-theoretic semantics for sentences expressing subjective judgment -- 1.2. Matters of fact and matters of opinion -- 1.3. Subjectivity as relative truth -- 1.4. Context, content, and denotation -- 1.5. Homomorphic interpretation and differentiation of content -- 2. Dismissing the easy alternatives -- 2.1. Indexical analyses -- 2.2. Quantificational analyses -- 2.3. Absolutism and ignorance -- 2.4. Expressivism -- 2.5. Metalinguistic and metacontextual conflict -- 3. Setting the syntactic and semantic stage -- 3.1. Syntactic assumptions -- 3.2. Pronouns, names, and anaphora -- 3.3. Common nouns, quantification, and binding -- 3.4. Negation and contradiction -- 3.5. Intensionality -- 4. Notes on the grammar of time and space -- 4.1. Tense -- 4.2. Spatial deixis -- 5. Basic relativist semantics -- 5.1. judge parameter -- 5.2. Revising the grammar -- 5.3. Extension to taste expressions -- 5.4. Truth in a relativist semantics -- 5.5. Derelativization in the object language -- 6. "Hidden" and "disguised" elements -- 6.1. Phonological reduction -- 6.2. Null elements in syntax -- 6.3. Unarticulated constituents -- 6.4. Constructional indexicality -- 6.5. Sublexical and compound indexicality -- 6.6. Indexical and quantificational interpretations of hidden elements -- 6.7. Conclusion -- 7. Pragmatics of truth assessment -- 7.1. Contexts of use and parameter values -- 7.2. Contexts of assessment and parameter values -- 7.3. Adopting a stance -- 7.4. Truth assessment and the adicity of true -- 7.5. Exocentricity and indexicality -- 7.6. Acentric stances -- 8. Attitude predicates in relativist semantics -- 8.1. Stance and belief -- 8.2. Factives, relativism, and speaker commitment -- 8.3. Infinitival clauses and time reference -- 8.4. Centered attitudes and control of infinitival subjects -- 8.5. Effective centering without PRO -- 8.6. De se belief and autocentric truth assessment -- 8.7. Against non-indexical contextualism -- 9. Assertion and other speech acts -- 9.1. Assertion, norms, and portrayal as true -- 9.2. Assertion, conversation, and context change -- 9.3. Why assert? -- 9.4. Questions -- 10. Between fact and opinion -- 10.1. Aesthetic judgment and refinement of taste -- 10.2. Contingent futures -- 10.3. Epistemic modality -- 10.4. Non-taste candidates for relativism: scalar cut-offs, sufficiency, and derogation -- 10.5. Conclusion -- 11. Reliability, imagination, and the functional motivation for relativism -- 11.1. evolutionary fable -- 11.2. Space and logical space -- 11.3. Reliability and traversable dimensions -- 11.4. Reliability-based content -- 11.5. From reliability to truth.
- ISBN
- 9780199573677 (hardcover)
- 9780199573684 (paperback)
- LCCN
- 2016942736
- OCLC
- ssj0002063535
- Author
Lasersohn, Peter.
- Title
Subjectivity and perspective in truth-theoretic semantics [electronic resource] / Peter Lasersohn.
- Imprint
Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Edition
First edition.
- Series
Oxford studies in semantics and pragmatics ; 8
Oxford studies in semantics and pragmatics ; 8.
- Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 259-266) and index.
- Access
Access restricted to authorized users.
- Connect to: