Research Catalog

Title

The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies / Masaaki Higashijima.

Author

Higashijima, Masaaki

Publication

• Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2022.
• ©2022

Items in the Library & Off-site

Details

Additional Authors

Michigan Publishing (University of Michigan), publisher.

Description

xxii, 341 pages : illustrations; 23 cm.

Summary

Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization.

Series Statement

Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies

Uniform Title

Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.

Subject

• Dictatorship
• Elections > Corrupt practices

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-324) and index.

Funding (note)

• Sponsored by Knowledge Unlatched

Contents

Part I. Puzzles and arguments -- Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. A theory of autocratic elections -- Part II. Cross-national explorations -- Chapter 3. Blatant electoral fraud -- Chapter 4. Institutional manipulation -- Chapter 5. Economic maneuvering -- Chapter 6. Backfiring at the Ballot Box -- Part III. Comparative case studies -- Chapter 7. From electoral manipulation to economic maneuvering : Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan -- Chapter 8. From electoral manipulation to autocratic breakdown : Akaev's Kyrgyzstan -- Chapter 9. Conclusion.

Call Number

JFE 22-4579

ISBN

• 9780472075317
• 0472075314
• 9780472055319
• 0472055313

LCCN

2022932724

OCLC

1328003568

Author

Higashijima, Masaaki, author.

Title

The dictator's dilemma at the ballot box : electoral manipulation, economic maneuvering, and political order in autocracies / Masaaki Higashijima.

Publisher

Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2022.

Copyright Date

©2022

Type of Content

text

still image

Type of Medium

unmediated

Type of Carrier

volume

Series

Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies

Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies series.

Bibliography

Includes bibliographical references (pages 301-324) and index.

Funding

Sponsored by Knowledge Unlatched

Note

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0

Added Author

Michigan Publishing (University of Michigan), publisher.

Research Call Number

JFE 22-4579