Research Catalog

Formal models of domestic politics /

Title
Formal models of domestic politics / Scott Gehlbach, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Author
Gehlbach, Scott.
Publication
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Supplementary Content
  • Contributor biographical information
  • Publisher description

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Details

Description
xvi, 228 pages; 24 cm.
Summary
  • "A unified and accessible treatment of important formal models of domestic politics appropriate for students in political science and economics"--
  • "Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers the first unified and accessible treatment of canonical and important new formal models of domestic politics. Intended for students in political science and economics who have already taken a course in game theory, the text covers eight classes of models: electoral competition under certainty and uncertainty, special interest politics, veto players, delegation, coalitions, political agency, and regime change. Political economists, comparativists, and Americanists alike will find the models here central to their research interests. The text assumes no mathematical knowledge beyond basic calculus, with an emphasis placed on clarity of presentation. Political scientists will appreciate the simplification of economic environments to focus on the political logic of models, economists will discover many important models of politics published outside of their discipline, and both instructors and students will value the numerous classroom-tested exercises"--
Series Statement
Analytical methods for social research
Uniform Title
Analytical methods for social research.
Subject
  • Elections > United States > Mathematical models
  • Political participation > United States > Mathematical models
  • Game theory
  • POLITICAL SCIENCE > General
  • Elections > Mathematical models
  • Political participation > Mathematical models
  • Innenpolitik
  • Spieltheorie
  • United States
Bibliography (note)
  • Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-222) and indexes.
Contents
1. Electoral competition under certainty -- 2. Electoral competition under uncertainty -- 3. Special interest -- 4. Veto players -- 5. Delegation -- 6. Coalitions -- 7. Political agency -- 8. Regime change.
ISBN
  • 9780521767156
  • 0521767156
  • 1107610427
  • 9781107610422
  • 9781107610422 (canceled/invalid)
LCCN
2012036928
OCLC
  • ocn814389607
  • 814389607
Owning Institutions
Columbia University Libraries