Research Catalog

Tet 1968 : understanding the surprise

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Item details
Status	Format	Access	Call Number	Item Location
Request for On-site Use Request Scan How do I pick up this item and when will it be ready?	Text	Request in advance	DS557.8.T4 F67 1995	Off-site

Description

xxi, 218 pages : illustrations; 22 cm.

Summary

Using information from newly translated Communist Vietnamese documents, combined with existing Western sources, Captain Ford explains and documents the actual significance of the offensive, which proves to be very different from that previously understood in America and the West.
The Vietnamese version of Tet reveals that while US forces achieved a tactical victory in the surprise battle, US intelligence misinterpreted the Communists' strategic intentions. For the North Vietnamese, a 'decisive victory' occurs when a superior force can be defeated not by military means but through external political or diplomatic developments that decide the outcome.
The North Vietnamese realized that, with the 1968 presidential elections approaching and world opinion in their favour, they would be able to demonstrate the legitimacy of their struggle and to convince the American public and policy-makers that a military victory would not be worth the cost. Their 'decisive victory' would be achieved with little risk.
Fundamentally, the Communists understood twenty-seven years ago the political and diplomatic nature of people's war, which many in the US military still find hard to comprehend. This book illustrates what the Americans missed and why they missed it.

Series Statement

Cass series--studies in intelligence

Uniform Title

Cass series--studies in intelligence.

Subject

Bibliography (note)

ISBN

0714645877 :

LCCN

94039310

OCLC

ocm31515920

Owning Institutions

Columbia University Libraries