Research Catalog

Title

Ten problems of consciousness : a representational theory of the phenomenal mind / Michael Tye.

Author

Tye, Michael.

Publication

Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, [1995], ©1995.

Items in the Library & Off-site

Details

Description

xvi, 248 pages : illustrations; 24 cm.

Series Statement

Representation and mind

Uniform Title

Representation and mind.

Subjects

• Philosophy of mind
• Mental representation
• Consciousness

Note

• "A Bradford book."

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references (p. [231]-239) and index.

Contents

• 1. The Ten Problems. 1.1. Phenomenal Consciousness Introduced. 1.2. The Problem of Ownership. 1.3. The Problem of Perspectival Subjectivity. 1.4. The Problem of Mechanism. 1.5. The Problem of Phenomenal Causation. 1.6. The Problem of Super Blindsight. 1.7. The Problem of Duplicates. 1.8. The Problem of the Inverted Spectrum. 1.9. The Problem of Transparency. 1.10. The Problem of Felt Location and Phenomenal Vocabulary. 1.11. The Problem of the Alien Limb -- 2. Why the Problems Run So Deep. 2.1. Must the Physical Be Objective? 2.2. Perspectival Subjectivity and the Explanatory Gap. 2.3. Physicalism and Phenomenal Causation. 2.4. On the Denial of Perspectival Subjectivity. 2.5. The Paradox of Phenomenal Consciousness. 2.6. The Available Strategies. 2.7. The Way Ahead -- 3. Can Anyone Else Feel My Pains? 3.1. The Repudiation of Phenomenal Objects. 3.2. Publicizing the Phenomenal: Split Brains. 3.3. Phenomenal Objects as Events. 3.4. A Closer Look at Events --
• 4. The Intentionality of Feelings and Experiences. 4.1. Intentional States and Intentional Content. 4.2. How Perceptual Sensations Represent. 4.3. Afterimages. 4.4. The Problem of Ownership Revisited. 4.5. Pains. 4.6. Other Bodily Sensations. 4.7. The Format of Sensory Representations. 4.8. Background Feelings. 4.9. Emotions. 4.10. Moods -- 5. What What It's Like Is Really Like. 5.1. Why Be an Intentionalist? 5.2. Phenomenal Content: The PANIC Theory. 5.3. Colors and Other "Secondary Qualities" 5.4. Can Duplicate Brains Differ Phenomenally? 5.5. Some Putative Counterexamples -- 6. The Tale of Mary and Mechanism: A Theory of Perspectival Subjectivity. 6.1. The Real Nature of the Phenomenal. 6.2. Perspectival Subjectivity and the Paradox. 6.3. Mary's Room. 6.4. Some of Mary's Philosophical Relatives. 6.5. The Explanatory Gap -- 7. Can You Really Imagine What You Think You Can? 7.1. The Status of the PANIC Theory.
• 7.2. Imaginability and Perception: A Parallel. 7.3. Troublesome Possibilities? 7.4. Zombie Replicas and Other Duplicates. 7.5. Inverted Experiences. 7.6. Inverted Earth. Appendix: Blindsight -- A.1 Three Sorts of Visual Agnosia -- A.2 An Empirical Proposal.

ISBN

0262201038

LCCN

95019301

OCLC

• 32547032
• ocm32547032

Owning Institutions

Columbia University Libraries