Research Catalog

Title

Antitrust policy and vertical restraints / Robert W. Hahn, editor.

Publication

Washington, D.C. : AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, [2006], ©2006.

Items in the Library & Off-site

Holdings

Details

Additional Authors

Hahn, Robert William.

Description

viii, 94 pages : illustrations; 23 cm

Summary

• This volume provides a survey of recent literature on certain aspects of vertical restraints. The book will make excellent supplementary reading for courses in industrial organization and other fields dealing with antitrust issues and will also be of interest to lawyers, researchers, and policy makers.
• "Antitrust law is intended to protect consumer welfare and foster competition. At first glance, however, it is often unclear whether certain business practices have positive or detrimental effects. Some activities that appear anticompetitive can actually prove beneficial to consumers. In Antitrust Policy and Vertical Restraints leading law and economics scholars take a hard look at how vertical restraints limit the conditions under which firms may purchase, sell, or resell a good or service." "Vertical restraints can be defined as any arrangement between firms operating at different levels of the manufacturing or distribution chain that restricts the conditions under which such firms may purchase, sell, or resell. Business tying and bundling practices, as one example, often come under scrutiny for depriving consumers of choice and driving up prices. In practice, however, bundling can lower costs and increase convenience." "In order to formulate efficient policy, we must be able to identify and limit those practices that are likely to do more harm than good. It is critical that policymakers and analysts know which vertical restraints are likely to harm consumers more than they benefit competition. The authors, representing both sides of the debate over tying practices, provide a broad and informed perspective on this important issue. Book jacket."--BOOK JACKET.

Subject

• Competition
• Commodity control
• Tie-ins (Marketing)
• Monopolies
• Antitrust law
• Concurrence
• Produits commerciaux > Réglementation
• Vente jumelée
• Monopoles
• Concurrence > Droit
• Antitrustpolitik
• Vertikale Bindung

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents

Introduction / Robert W. Hahn -- Two tales of bundling : implications for the application of antitrust law to bundled discounts / Bruce H. Kobayashi -- Why tie an essential good? / Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman -- Tying : the poster child for antitrust modernization / David S. Evans.

ISBN

• 0815733917 (pbk. : alk. paper)
• 9780815733911 (pbk. : alk. paper)

LCCN

2006012580

OCLC

• ocm67240595
• 67240595
• SCSB-5931545

Owning Institutions

Columbia University Libraries