Research Catalog

Title

Conquest in cyberspace : national security and information warfare / Martin C. Libicki.

Author

Libicki, Martin C.

Publication

New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Supplementary Content

• Contributor biographical information
• Publisher description

Items in the Library & Off-site

Holdings

Details

Additional Authors

Rand Corporation.

Description

xii, 323 pages : illustrations; 23 cm

Subjects

• Computer networks > Security measures
• Information warfare
• National security
• Cyberterrorism

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents

1. Introduction -- 1.1. What Does Conquest Mean in Cyberspace? -- 1.2. Precis -- 2. Hostile Conquest as Information Warfare -- 2.1. An Ideal-Type Definition of Information Warfare -- 2.1.1. Control at One Layer Is Not Control at Another -- 2.1.2. Applying the Ideal-Type Definition -- 2.2. There Is No Forced Entry in Cyberspace -- 2.3. Information Warfare Only Looks Strategic -- 2.3.1. IW Strategy and Terrorism -- 2.4. Conclusions -- 3. Information Warfare as Noise -- 3.1. Disinformation and Misinformation -- 3.2. Defenses against Noise -- 3.2.1. Redundancy -- 3.2.2. Filtration -- 3.3. What Tolerance for Noise? -- 3.3.1. Tolerance in Real Environments -- 3.3.2. Castles and Agoras -- 3.3.3. Hopping from Agoras to Castles? -- 3.3.4. Castling Foes -- 3.4. Concluding Observations -- 4. Can Information Warfare Be Strategic? -- 4.1. Getting In -- 4.2. Mucking Around -- 4.2.1. Spying -- 4.2.2. Denial of Service -- 4.2.3. Corruption -- 4.2.4. Distraction -- 4.3. Countermeasures -- 4.3.1. Redundancy -- 4.3.2. Learning -- 4.4. Damage Assessment -- 4.5. Prediction -- 4.5.1. Intelligence Is Necessary -- 4.5.2. Intelligence Alone Is Hardly Sufficient -- 4.6. Is Information Warfare Ready for War? -- 4.6.1. The Paradox of Control -- 4.6.2. Other Weaponization Criteria -- 4.7. Conclusions -- 5. Information Warfare against Command and Control -- 5.1. The Sources of Information Overload -- 5.1.1. Its Effect on Conventional Information Warfare Techniques -- 5.2. Coping Strategies -- 5.2.1. Who Makes Decisions in a Hierarchy? -- 5.2.2. Responses to Information Overload -- 5.3. Know the Enemy's Information Architecture -- 5.3.1. Elements of Information Culture -- 5.3.2. Elements of Nodal Architecture -- 5.3.3. Injecting Information into Adversary Decision Making -- 5.4. Ping, Echo, Flood, and Sag -- 5.4.1. Ping and Echo -- 5.4.2. Flood and Sag -- 5.5. Conclusions -- 6. Friendly Conquest in Cyberspace -- 6.1. A Redefinition of Conquest -- 6.2. The Mechanisms of Coalitions -- 6.2.1. The Particular Benefits of Coalitions -- 6.2.2. Information and Coalitions -- 6.2.3. The Cost of Coalitions in Cyberspace -- 6.3. Enterprise Architectures and Influence -- 6.4. Alliances with Individuals -- 6.4.1. The Special Case of Cell Phones -- 6.5. Alliances of Organizations -- 6.5.1. Ecologics of Technological Development -- 6.5.2. DoD's Global Information Grid (GIG) -- 6.5.3. Merging the Infrastructures of Allies -- 6.6. Conclusions -- 7. Friendly Conquest Using Global Systems -- 7.1. Geospatial Data -- 7.1.1. Coping with Commercial Satellites -- 7.1.2. Manipulation through Cyberspace -- 7.1.3. Getting Others to Play the Game -- 7.1.4. Some Conclusions about Geospatial Services -- 7.2. National Identity Systems -- 7.2.1. Two Rationales for a National Identity System -- 7.2.2. Potential Parameters for a Notional System -- 7.2.3. Constraints from and Influences over Foreign Systems -- 7.3. Compare, Contrast, and Conclude -- 8. Retail Conquest in Cyberspace -- 8.1. Information Trunks and Leaves -- 8.2. Where Does Cheap Information Come From? -- 8.3. Surveillance in Cyberspace -- 8.4. Making Information Global -- 8.5. Privacy -- 8.6. Amalgamating Private Information -- 8.7. Using the Information -- 8.7.1. General Coercion -- 8.7.2. Specific Coercion -- 8.7.3. Persuasion -- 8.8. Some Limits of Retail Warfare in Cyberspace -- 8.9. Using Retail Channels to Measure Wholesale Campaigns -- 8.10. Conclusions -- 9. From Intimacy, Vulnerability -- 9.1. Do the Walls Really Come Down? -- 9.2. Intimacy as a Target -- 9.3. The Fecklessness of Friends -- 9.4. Betrayal -- 9.5. Conclusions -- 10. Talking Conquest in Cyberspace -- 10.1. Four Layers of Communications -- 10.1.1. Human Conversation in Layers -- 10.1.2. Cyberspace in Layers -- 10.2. Complexity Facilitates Conquest -- 10.2.1. Complexity and Hostile Conquest -- 10.2.2. Complexity and Friendly Conquest -- 10.3. Semantics -- 10.4. Pragmatics -- 10.5. Lessons? -- 11. Managing Conquest in Cyberspace -- 11.1. Conducting Hostile Conquest in Cyberspace -- 11.2. Warding Off Hostile Conquest in Cyberspace -- 11.2.1. Byte Bullies -- 11.2.2. Headless Horsemen -- 11.2.3. Perfect Prevention -- 11.2.4. Total Transparency -- 11.2.5. Nasty Neighborhoods -- 11.3. Exploiting Unwarranted Influence -- 11.4. Against Unwarranted Influence -- 11.4.1. In Microsoft's Shadow -- 11.4.2. Microsoft and Computer Security -- 11.5. Conclusions -- Appendix A. Why Cyberspace Is Likely to Gain Consequence -- A.1. More Powerful Hardware and Thus More Complex Software -- A.2. Cyberspace in More Places -- A.3. Fuzzier Borders between Systems -- A.4. Accepted Cryptography -- A.5. Privatized Trust -- A.6. The Possible Substitution of Artificial for Natural Intelligence -- A.7. Conclusions.

ISBN

• 9780521871600 (hardback)
• 0521871603 (hardback)
• 9780521692144 (pbk.)
• 0521692148 (pbk.)

LCCN

2006030973

OCLC

• ocm71552276
• 71552276
• SCSB-5373798

Owning Institutions

Columbia University Libraries