Research Catalog

Constraining proliferation : the contribution of verification synergies / by Patricia Bliss McFate ... [et al.] ; prepared for the Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada.

Title
Constraining proliferation : the contribution of verification synergies / by Patricia Bliss McFate ... [et al.] ; prepared for the Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada.
Publication
Ottawa : The Division, 1993.

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StatusFormatAccessCall NumberItem Location
TextUse in library UA12.5 .C66 1993xOff-site

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Additional Authors
  • Canada. Arms Control and Disarmament Division.
  • Canada. Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division.
  • McFate, Patricia Bliss.
Description
v, 70 p. : ill.; 28 cm.
Summary
"While many studies have evaluated specific verification techniques, procedures or agencies, relatively little has been written about the multiplier effects associated with verification synergies. This study argues that the combination of separate aspects of arms control verification produces a whole greater than the sum obtainable from each of the separate parts. The term "synergies" encompasses the combinative effects arising between verification methods and techniques, between agreements or regimes, between implementing mechanisms and forums, between organizations and agencies within a country, between countries party to an agreement, and various combinations of these items. The resultant synergistic effects may be simultaneous or sequential. This paper identifies many of these effects, using specific arms control examples, where appropriate, and with special emphasis on examples relating to non-proliferation. It also provides a basis for taking these synergies into account during the process of formulating and evaluating the effectiveness of the verification regimes of particular agreements and actions. This paper considers three forms of verification: co-operative, adversarial and coercive, as exemplified by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the UNSCOM inspections in Iraq following the War in the Gulf, respectively. Appendices A and B take a second approach, addressing the subject from a different perspective, using a high level of abstraction. Deriving a formal model of some aspects of verification synergies, a mathematical analysis is presented in Appendix A to demonstrate several underlying dynamics of the topic."--Page iii.
Series Statement
Arms control verification studies, 0828-3664 ; no. 5
Uniform Title
Arms control verification studies ; no. 5.
Subject
  • Arms control > Verification
  • Disarmament
  • Nuclear arms control > Verification
  • Nuclear nonproliferation
  • Security, International
Note
  • Abstract in French.
Bibliography (note)
  • Includes bibliographical references.
Processing Action (note)
  • committed to retain
Contents
  • List of abbreviations -- Abstract -- Résumé -- Acknowledgments -- Disclaimer -- Preface -- I. Purpose and scope of study / Patricia Bliss McFate -- II. Key findings / Patricia Bliss McFate -- III. Introduction and assumptions / Patricia Bliss McFate -- Assumptions about constraining proliferation (1992-2002) -- Weapons of mass destruction and advanced delivery systems -- Regional concerns -- Assumptions about future verification requirements related to constraining proliferation -- Assumptions about future verification methods and techniques -- IV. Constraining proliferation: verification regimes for multilateral agreements -- Past verification regimes / Sidney N. Graybeal and Patricia Bliss McFate -- The verification regime for CFE / George Lindsey -- Lessons learned from bilateral regimes / Sidney N. Graybeal and Patricia Bliss McFate -- Verification and confidence-building regimes for existing and potential agreements / Patricia Bliss McFate and Sidney N. Graybeal --^
  • Strengthening the NPT: IAEA safeguards -- Elimination of nuclear weapons -- Cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes -- Limitations on tests, reducing the TTBT/PNET thresholds, testing for safety purposes, a CTB -- Strengthening the MTCR -- The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) -- Confidence-building, transparency and conventional force regimes / George Lindsey -- Aerial surveillance and "open skies" -- Monitoring the testing of weapons systems -- Personnel limitations -- Arms transfers -- V. Adversarial and coercive verification / George Lindsey -- VI. Synergistic effects among verification and confidence-building methods / Patricia Bliss McFate and Sidney N. Graybeal -- Synergistic effects among regimes, agencies, countries and regional groups / George Lindsey -- Synergistic effects among implementing bodies and in the United Nations / Sidney N. Graybeal --^
  • VII. Impact of verification synergies on the nature and scope of various treaty regimes which curb proliferation / Patricia Bliss McFate and Sidney N. Graybeal -- Appendix A. Formal methods of verification synergy / Marc Kilgour -- Appendix B. Combining different types of information using Bayesian statistics / George Lindsey -- Appendix C. Synergies related to environmental and other non-military issues / George Lindsey -- Appendix D. Suggestions for future research / Sidney N. Graybeal and George Lindsey -- Appendix E. Additional reading -- Authors' résumés.
ISBN
066220347X
LCCN
cn^93099452^
Owning Institutions
Harvard Library