Research Catalog

Title

• The conflict over Kosovo : why Milosevic decided to settle when he did / Stephen T. Hosmer.

Author

Hosmer, Stephen T.

Publication

Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 2001.

Items in the Library & Off-site

Holdings

Details

Additional Authors

Project Air Force (U.S.)

Description

xxxi, 155 p.; 22 cm.

Summary

"Why did Slobodan Milosevic, the then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, decide on June 3, 1999, to accept NATO's conditions for terminating the conflict over Kosovo? Drawing in part upon the testimony of Milosevic and other senior Serb and foreign officials who directly interacted with Milosevic, this book examines (1) the assumptions and other calculations that underlay Milosevic's initial decision to defy NATO's demands with regard to Kosovo, and (2) the political, economic, and military developments and pressures, and the resulting expectations and concerns that most importantly influenced his subsequent decision to come to terms. While several interrelated factors, including Moscow's eventual endorsement of NATO's terms, helped shape Milosevic's decision to yield, it was the cumulative effect of NATO air power that proved most decisive. The allied bombing of Serbia's infrastructure targets, as it intensified, stimulated a growing interest among both the Serbian public and Belgrade officials to end the conflict. Milosevic's belief that the bombing that would follow a rejection of NATO's June 2 peace terms would be massively destructive and threatening to his continued rule made a settlement seem imperative."--Jacket.

Alternative Title

Why Milosevic decided to settle when he did

Subject

• 1998-1999
• Geschichte
• Kosovo War, 1998-1999
• Milošević, Slobodan, 1941-2006
• Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord

Note

• "Prepared for the United States Air Force."

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references.

Processing Action (note)

• committed to retain

Contents

Ch. 1. Introduction -- Ch. 2. He Assumed Accepting Rambouillet Terms Would Endanger his Rule -- Ch. 3. He Assumed He Could Force NATO to Offer Better Terms -- Ch. 4. He Realized That His Hoped-for Leverage on NATO Had Evaporated -- Ch. 5. Bombing Produced a Popular Climate Conducive to Concessions -- Ch. 6. Damage to "Dual-Use" Infrastructure Generated Growing Pressure -- Ch. 7. Damage to Military Forces and KLA "Resurgence" Generated Little Pressure -- Ch. 8. He Expected Unconstrained Bombing if NATO's Terms Were Rejected -- Ch. 9. He Probably Also Worried About Threat of Future Invasion -- Ch. 10. He Believed NATO's Terms Provided Him With Some Political Cover -- Ch. 11. Concluding Observations.

ISBN

0833030035

LCCN

^^2001031973

OCLC

46976540

Owning Institutions

Harvard Library