Research Catalog

Deliberate discretion? : the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy / John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan.

Title
Deliberate discretion? : the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy / John D. Huber, Charles R. Shipan.
Author
Huber, John D.
Publication
New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002.

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TextUse in library JF229 .H833 2002Off-site

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Details

Additional Authors
Shipan, Charles R., 1961-
Description
xv, 284 p.; 24 cm.
Summary
  • "The authors address these issues by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the U.S. states, they argue that particular institutional forms - such as the nature of electoral laws, the structure of the legal system, and the professionalism of the legislature - have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policymaking process."--Jacket.
  • "The laws that legislature adopt provide a crucial opportunity for elected politicians to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy vary considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in an effort to micromanage policymaking processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial discretion to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter?"
Series Statement
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Uniform Title
Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
Subject
  • Bureaucracy
  • Comparative government
  • Law > Political aspects
  • Political planning
  • Separation of powers
Bibliography (note)
  • Includes bibliographical references (p. 259-274) and indexes.
Processing Action (note)
  • committed to retain
Contents
Laws, bureaucratic autonomy, and the comparative study of delegation -- Rational delegation or helpless abdication? : the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians -- Statutes as blueprints for policymaking -- A comparative theory of legislation, discretion, and the policymaking process -- Legislation, agency policymaking, and Medicaid in Michigan -- The design of laws across separation of powers systems -- The design of laws across parliamentary systems -- Laws, institutions, and policymaking processes.
ISBN
  • 0521817447 (hardback)
  • 0521520703 (pbk.)
LCCN
^^2002016560
Owning Institutions
Harvard Library