Research Catalog

Autonomy, incentives and patronage : a study of corruption in the Tanzania and Uganda revenue authorities / Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Ivar Kolstad, Siri Lange.

Title: Autonomy, incentives and patronage : a study of corruption in the Tanzania and Uganda revenue authorities / Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Ivar Kolstad, Siri Lange.
Author: Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge.
Publication: Bergen, Norway : Chr. Michelsen Institute, [2003]

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Summary

The report explores factors that explain the observed patterns of corruption within the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). In particular, the study discusses the key assumptions behind the revenue authority model and the relevance of these in an African context characterised by scarcity of qualified tax officers, accountants and auditors, as well as clientilistic networks between political, bureaucratic and economic agents. Based on this analysis and in light of existing political, economic and administrative constraints, the study identifies options available for sustainable tax administrative reforms in the two countries. Issues of particular relevance for foreign assistance towards fighting fiscal corruption and strengthening tax administration are highlighted.

Series Statement

Report / Chr. Michelsen Institute, 0805-505X ; R2003:9

Uniform Title

Report (Chr. Michelsens institutt) ; R2003:9.

Subject

Bibliography (note)

Includes bibliographical references.

Processing Action (note)

committed to retain

ISBN

8280620621

Owning Institutions

Harvard Library