Research Catalog

False alarms, true dangers? : current and future risks of inadvertent U.S.-Russian nuclear war / Anthony M. Barrett.

Title
False alarms, true dangers? : current and future risks of inadvertent U.S.-Russian nuclear war / Anthony M. Barrett.
Author
Barrett, Anthony M.
Publication
  • Santa Monica, Calif. : RAND Corporation, [2016]
  • ©2016

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TextRequest in advance U263 .B38 2016Off-site

Details

Description
19 pages : illustrations; 21 x 23 cm.
Summary
"In the post-Cold War era, it is tempting to see the threat of nuclear war between the United States and Russia as remote: Both nations' nuclear arsenals have shrunk since their Cold War peaks, and neither nation is actively threatening the other with war. A number of analysts, however, warn of the risk of an inadvertent nuclear conflict between the United States and Russia - that is, a conflict that begins when one nation misinterprets an event (such as a training exercise, a weather phenomenon, or a malfunction) as an indicator of a nuclear attack or a provocation. Understanding how miscalculations and misperceptions can lead to the use of nuclear weapons is an important step toward reducing the probability of an inadvertent nuclear conflict. At present, the United States does not appear to have a consistently used method for assessing the risk of inadvertent nuclear war. To address this gap, this report synthesizes key points from the literature on the pathways by which, and the conditions under which, misinterpretations could lead to a nuclear strike, either by U.S. or Russian forces. By shedding light on these risks, this report hopes to inform decisionmakers about measures that both nations can take to reduce the probability of an inadvertent nuclear conflict"--Publisher's description.
Series Statement
Perspective
Alternative Title
Current and future risks of inadvertent U.S.-Russian nuclear war
Subject
  • Nuclear warfare
  • Ballistic missiles
  • First strike (Nuclear strategy)
  • Nuclear weapons > United States
  • Nuclear weapons > Russia (Federation)
  • Nuclear crisis stability
  • Nuclear nonproliferation
  • United States > Military policy
  • Russia (Federation) > Military policy
Note
  • "PE-191-TSF"--Page [20].
  • Caption title.
Bibliography (note)
  • Includes bibliographical references (pages 18-19).
Processing Action (note)
  • committed to retain
OCLC
952501737
Owning Institutions
Harvard Library