Research Catalog

Title

Policies for managing reductions in military end strength : using incentive pays to draw down the force / Michael G. Mattock, James Hosek, Beth J. Asch.

Author

Mattock, Michael G., 1961-

Publication

Santa Monica, Calif. : RAND Corporation, [2016]

Items in the Library & Off-site

Holdings

Details

Additional Authors

• Hosek, James R.
• Asch, Beth J.
• National Defense Research Institute (U.S.)

Description

xvii, 50 pages; 28 cm

Summary

"Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation requested RAND National Defense Research Institute help in developing an efficient means of decreasing force size. The researchers proposed the use of voluntary separation pay (VSP) and showed how it can be designed to meet drawdown goals within a certain time frame without over- or undershooting the goals. RAND's dynamic retention model determined the appropriate VSP levels by year of service to achieve drawdowns of alternative sizes for the active component Army, and the approach could be applied to other services. The analysis was done for enlisted personnel and officers and for the steady state and the transition to it. The analysis suggests that VSPs can draw down the force rapidly without creating a hollow force or bathtub. Implementing VSPs requires an increase in outlays, but net decreases in personnel costs can still be realized even if selected military occupational specialties are cut deeply. The net decrease in personnel cost is less if a VSP is offered for multiple years, if members anticipate that a VSP will be offered in a future year, or if deeper cuts are made to portions of the force versus a shallower across-the-board cut. For a 10-percent cut in the force, net decreases range from 6.4 billion to 7.4 billion in 2013 dollars over the first ten years. The Army would initially require 1.7 billion to 3 billion to implement VSPs for such a cut, depending on how it is done"--Publisher's description.

Alternative Title

Using incentive pays to draw down the force

Subject

• 2000-2099
• United States > Evaluation
• United States > Retirement
• United States > Reorganization
• United States > Military policy > 21st century

Note

• "RR-545-OSD"--Cover page 4.
• At head of title: RAND National Defense Research Institute.
• "Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense."

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references (pages 49-50).

Processing Action (note)

• committed to retain

Contents

Preface -- Figures and Tables -- Summary -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Policies to Achieve a Drawdown: Decreased Accessions -- Early Outs with Voluntary Departure -- Denial of Continuation or Reenlistment -- Tighter Physical Standards -- Tighter Promotion Standards -- Involuntary Separation Pay -- Voluntary Separation Incentive and Special Separation Bonus -- Voluntary Separation Pay -- 3. An Overview of the Approach -- 4. Results: Using Incentives to Draw Down the Force -- How Large Do Voluntary Separation Pays Need to Be to Induce People to Leave Voluntarily? -- Personnel Costs Still Decrease If Selected Enlisted Military Occupational Specialties Are Cut Deeply -- Cost Change Under Broader and Narrower Drawdowns of a Given Size -- Voluntary Separation Pay Can Be Smaller If Members Are Given More Time -- A Higher Voluntary Separation Pay Is Required When the Voluntary Separation Pay Policy Is Announced Ahead of Time -- Present Value of the Decrease in Net Personnel Costs Under Different Alternatives -- 5. Concluding Thoughts: Key Findings -- Comparing Voluntary Separation Pay with Involuntary Separation Pay, Voluntary Separation Incentive, and Special Separation Bonus -- APPENDIX: The Dynamic Retention Model -- References.

ISBN

• 9780833092311
• 0833092316

OCLC

• 960701177
• SCSB-10325128

Owning Institutions

Harvard Library