Research Catalog

Title

The Afghanistan question and the reset in U.S.-Russian relations / Richard J. Krickus.

Author

Krickus, Richard J.

Publication

Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, [2011]

Items in the Library & Off-site

Details

Additional Authors

Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n80120847

Description

xii, 159 p.; 23 cm.

Summary

• Introduction -- The American skeptics -- Russian skeptics -- The American rationale -- The Russian rationale -- The study's objectives -- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The decision to invade -- Escalation -- Bringing the Red Army home -- What was happening? -- The U.S. reaction -- The end -- The failure to create a stable post-Soviet government and civil war. The United Nations proposal -- Why the proposal failed -- Washington's and Moscow's failure -- The Taliban and Osama bin Laden. The origins of the Taliban -- Osama bin Laden -- The United States acknowledges bin Laden as a threat -- 9/11 and war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The September 2001 terrorist attacks -- Routing the jihadists -- The Karzai government -- Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda : an assessment -- A partial victory -- Three scenarios. The existing situation or plan A : an unstable but viable Afghanistan through COIN -- The insurgency -- The Karzai government -- Security forces -- The civilian-economic component -- Declining support for the war within the United States -- Pakistan -- Plan B : partition -- A Taliban victory -- The global jihadists prevail -- The Taliban return to power with a national agenda -- The Russian response -- Countering Afghan narcotics -- The struggle over Manas -- The northern distribution network -- Central Asia and the North Caucasus -- Concluding remarks and recommendations. Identifying the enemy : a civil war within Islam -- Making room for the rest -- The American malaise -- Sticking to the 2014 Afghanistan exit schedule -- Preparing for Bonn II -- Plan B : partition -- Preparing for the worst case scenario (Plan C) : a Taliban victory -- Confronting Pakistan -- The time has come to reduce our profile in the Middle East -- Sustaining and enlarging security cooperation with Russia.
• The ability of the United States and Russia to cooperate in Afghanistan represents a solid test of their reset in relations. The author provides the historical background to the Afghanistan Question and assesses current events in the Afghan war with three objectives in mind: 1) to determine whether Russian-American cooperation in Afghanistan has been successful; 2) to identify and evaluate the successes and failures of the counterinsurgency strategy as the transition from U.S. to Afghanistan authority gains traction in the 2011-14 time frame; and 3) to provide conclusions and recommendations bearing on developments in Afghanistan.

Series Statement

Letort paper ; [no. 52]

Uniform Title

Letort papers ; [no. 52]

Alternative Title

• Afghanistan question and the reset in US-Russian relations
• Afghanistan question and the reset in United States-Russian relations

Subjects

• USA
• Afghanistankrieg (2001)
• Afghanistan-Konflikt (1979-1992)
• Sowjetunion
• Russland
• Internationale Kooperation
• United States > Foreign relations > Russia (Federation)
• Afghanistan > Politics and government > 20th century
• Afghan War, 2001- > Russia (Federation)
• Afghanistan > Politics and government > 21st century
• Geschichte 1979-2011
• Internationale Politik
• Russia (Federation) > Foreign relations > United States

Note

• "October 2011."

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references.

Additional Formats (note)

• Also available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.

Contents

Summary -- Introduction -- The American skeptics -- Russian skeptics -- The American rationale -- The Russian rationale -- The study's objectives -- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The decision to invade -- Escalation -- Bringing the Red Army home -- What was happening? -- The U.S. reaction -- The end -- The failure to create a stable post-Soviet government and civil war. The United Nations proposal -- Why the proposal failed -- Washington's and Moscow's failure -- The Taliban and Osama bin Laden. The origins of the Taliban -- Osama bin Laden -- The United States acknowledges bin Laden as a threat -- 9/11 and war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The September 2001 terrorist attacks -- Routing the jihadists -- The Karzai government -- Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda : an assessment -- A partial victory -- Three scenarios. The existing situation or plan A : an unstable but viable Afghanistan through COIN -- The insurgency -- The Karzai government -- Security forces -- The civilian-economic component -- Declining support for the war within the United States -- Pakistan -- Plan B : partition -- A Taliban victory -- The global jihadists prevail -- The Taliban return to power with a national agenda -- The Russian response -- Countering Afghan narcotics -- The struggle over Manas -- The northern distribution network -- Central Asia and the North Caucasus -- Concluding remarks and recommendations. Identifying the enemy : a civil war within Islam -- Making room for the rest -- The American malaise -- Sticking to the 2014 Afghanistan exit schedule -- Preparing for Bonn II -- Plan B : partition -- Preparing for the worst case scenario (Plan C) : a Taliban victory -- Confronting Pakistan -- The time has come to reduce our profile in the Middle East -- Sustaining and enlarging security cooperation with Russia.

ISBN

• 9781584875130
• 1584875135

LCCN

2011506677

Owning Institutions

Princeton University Library