Research Catalog

Title

Incentives : motivation and the economics of information / Donald E. Campbell.

Author

Campbell, Donald E. (Donald Edward), 1943-

Publication

Cambridge, England ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Items in the Library & Off-site

Details

Description

xii, 355 pages : illustrations; 26 cm

Summary

• A successful organization must coordinate the activities of its constituent parts. Effective coordination is problematic when the components of the organization are managed by individuals whose primary concern is personal gain, not the success of the institution. However, if everyone is motivated by narrow self-interest, the pursuit of self-interest will be self-defeating unless individual decisions are made under incentives that foster the organization's goals. This book studies incentive environments, and evaluates the resulting performance of a wide range of institutions. It also investigates the extent to which performance can be improved by modifying the incentives.
• Professor Campbell's treatment of the economics of information, mechanism design, and game theory from the standpoint of incentives can be followed by anyone with a basic knowledge of single-variable calculus and intermediate microeconomic theory. Readers learn the principles by working through examples, and not by digesting proofs of general theorems. Upper-level undergraduates and master's-level students will find the material particularly useful, as will Ph. D. students seeking a better grasp of theoretical principles through worked examples.

Subject

• Social choice > Mathematical models
• Anreiz
• Asymmetrische Information
• Informationsökonomie
• Kollektiventscheidung
• Mathematisches Modell
• Public-Choice-Theorie
• Wirtschaftliches Verhalten
• Social choice
• Welvaartstheorie
• Motivatie
• Employee motivation
• Communication in organizations
• Incentives in industry
• Information theory in economics
• Théorie des jeux
• Économie du bien-être > Modèles mathématiques
• Microéconomie
• Choix collectif > Modèles mathématiques
• Information, Théorie de l', en économie politique

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents

1. Introduction. 1. Asymmetric information. 2. Taxi! 3. Safety inspections. 4. Resource allocation. 5. Efficiency. 6. Joint ventures. 7. The prisoner's dilemma. 8. Equilibrium. 9. Introduction to calculus. 10. The composite commodity theorem. 11. Quasi-linear preferences. 12. Decision making under risk -- 2. Hidden action. 1. Shareholders and managers. 2. The savings and loan crisis. 3. Mandatory retirement. 4. Moral hazard and insurance. 5. Partnerships. 6. The owner-employee relationship. 7. Agency theory -- 3. Hidden characteristics. 1. Price discrimination. 2. Auctions. 3. Voting. 4. Public goods. 5. The firm's quality choice. 6. Publish or perish. 7. Job-market signalling. 8. The market for lemons. 9. Bargaining. 10. Competitive insurance markets -- 4. Reputation. 1. Competition and reputation. 2. Basketball is a zero-sum game; so is football. 3. Subgame-perfect equilibria. 4. Partnerships. 5. The repeated prisoner's dilemma game.

ISBN

• 0521472644
• 9780521472647
• 052147857X
• 9780521478571

LCCN

• 94041816
• ZBWT00623351

OCLC

• ocm31605987
• 31605987
• SCSB-2066122

Owning Institutions

Princeton University Library