Research Catalog

Title

Spatial interaction models : facility location using game theory / Lina Mallozzi, Egidio D'Amato, Panos M. Pardalos, editors.

Publication

• Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2017]
• ©2017

Items in the Library & Off-site

Details

Additional Authors

• Pardalos, P. M. (Panos M.), 1954-
• Mallozzi, Lina
• D'Amato, Egidio

Description

x, 327 pages : illustrations; 25 cm

Summary

Facility location theory develops the idea of locating one or more facilities by optimizing suitable criteria such as minimizing transportation cost, or capturing the largest market share. The contributions in this book focus an approach to facility location theory through game theoretical tools highlighting situations where a location decision is faced by several decision makers and leading to a game theoretical framework in non-cooperative and cooperative methods. Models and methods regarding the facility location via game theory are explored and applications are illustrated through economics, engineering, and physics. Mathematicians, engineers, economists and computer scientists working in theory, applications and computational aspects of facility location problems using game theory will find this book useful.

Series Statement

Springer optimization and its applications, 1931-6828 ; volume 118

Uniform Title

Springer optimization and its applications ; v. 118.

Subject

• Game theory
• Spatial analysis (Statistics)
• Mathematical models
• Location problems (Programming)
• Game Theory
• Models, Theoretical
• Théorie des jeux
• Analyse spatiale (Statistique)
• Modèles mathématiques
• Problèmes de localisation (Programmation)
• spatial analysis
• mathematical models
• Facility location theory
• Facility location models

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references.

Contents

• Bilevel Models on the Competitive Facility Location Problem -- Partial Cooperation in Location Choice: Salop's Model with Three Firms -- A Class of Location Games with Type Dependent Facilities -- Location Methods and Nash Equilibria for Experimental Design in Astrophysics and Aerospace Engineering -- Leader-Follower Models in Facility Location -- Asymmetries in Competitive Location Models on the Line -- Huff-Like Stackelberg Location Problems on the Plane -- A Game Theoretic Approach to an Emergency Units Location Problem -- An Equilibrium-Econometric Analysis of Rental Housing Markets with Indivisibilities -- Large Spatial Competition -- Facility Location Situations and Related Games in Cooperation -- Sequential Entry in Hotelling Model with Location Costs: A Three-Firm Case -- Nash Equilibria in Network Facility Location Under Delivered Prices -- Sharing Costs in Some Distinguished Location Problems.
• 1.2 Partial Cooperation in a Two-Stage Salop Model of Product Differentiation1.3 Relationship to Some Other Literature; 2 The Two-Stage Salop Model with Linear Costs; 2.1 Consumers; 2.2 Formalisation of the Two-Stage Salop Model; 2.3 The Existence of a Solution in the Linear Cost Model; 2.4 Introducing Partial Cooperation in the Linear Cost Model; 3 Extensions of the Two-Stage Salop Model; 3.1 Introducing Endogenous Marginal Production Costs; 3.2 Quadratic Cost Structure; 3.2.1 Nash Equilibrium; 3.2.2 Partial Cooperative Equilibrium; References
• A Class of Location Games with Type Dependent Facilities1 Introduction; 2 The Model; 3 Location Games with Type Dependent Facilities with a Non-empty Core; 4 A Non-cooperative Approach; 5 Concluding Remarks; References; Location Methods and Nash Equilibria for Experimental Design in Astrophysics and Aerospace Engineering; Notation; 1 Introduction; 2 Location Problem in Two Dimensions; 2.1 Preliminaries of Game Theory; 2.2 DoE as a Facility Location Game; 3 Sensor Location in Experiment for Astrophysics; 3.1 Absence of Demand Points; 3.2 Presence of Demand Points
• 4 Design of a Test Matrix for an Envelope Expansion Flight Test Activity5 Conclusions; References; Leader-Follower Models in Facility Location; 1 Introduction; 2 Overview of Covering Models; 3 Overview of Competitive Facility Location Problems; 3.1 The Proximity Rule; 3.2 The Minimum Utility Rule; 3.3 The Random Utility Rule; 3.4 The Cover-Based Rule; 3.5 The Gravity (Huff) Rule; 3.6 Implementation Issues; 3.7 Extensions; 4 Leader-Follower Models in Competitive Models; 4.1 The Leader-Follower Model Locating Two Facilities in the Plane
• 4.2 A Leader-Follower Model for Covering a Large Area with Numerous Facilities4.3 The Leader-Follower Problem Using the Gravity (Huff) Rule; 4.3.1 Calculating the Market Share; 4.3.2 The Optimization; 4.3.3 Computational Experiments; 4.4 The Leader-Follower Model Using the Cover-Based Rule; 4.4.1 Estimating Market Share; 4.4.2 Computational Experiments; 5 Overview of Models Addressing the Location of Unreliable Facilities; 6 The Defensive Maximal Covering Location Problem; 6.1 Properties of the Problem on a Tree; 6.2 Heuristic Algorithms for the Solution of the Leader's Location Problem

ISBN

• 9783319526539
• 3319526537
• 9783319526546
• 3319526545

LCCN

2017934484

OCLC

• ocn967501174
• 967501174
• SCSB-8807919

Owning Institutions

Princeton University Library