Research Catalog

Title

Structured to fail? : regulatory performance under competing mandates / Christopher Carrigan.

Author

Carrigan, Christopher

Publication

• Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2017.
• ©2017

Items in the Library & Off-site

Details

Description

xv, 320 pages : illustrations; 24 cm

Summary

• "In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory missions undermined each agency's ability to be an effective regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by employing a diverse set of research methods, including a statistical analysis, an in-depth case study of US regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases"--
• "Regulatory Performance under Competing Mandates In the search for explanations for three of the most pressing crises of the early twenty-first century (the housing meltdown and financial crisis, the Gulf oil spill, and the nuclear disaster at Fukushima), commentators pointed to the structure of the regulatory agencies charged with overseeing the associated industries, noting that the need to balance competing regulatory and non-regulatory missions undermined each agency's ability to be an effective regulator. Christopher Carrigan challenges this critique by employing a diverse set of research methods, including a statistical analysis, an in- depth case study of US regulatory oversight of offshore oil and gas development leading up to the Gulf oil spill, and a formal theoretical discussion, to systematically evaluate the benefits and concerns associated with either combining or separating regulatory and non-regulatory missions. His analysis demonstrates for policymakers and scholars why assigning competing non-regulatory missions to regulatory agencies can still be better than separating them in some cases"--

Subject

• 2008-2011
• Administrative agencies > United States > Evaluation > Case studies
• Administrative procedure > Political aspects > United States
• BP Deepwater Horizon Explosion and Oil Spill, 2010
• Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, Japan, 2011
• Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009
• POLITICAL SCIENCE > Public Policy > Economic Policy
• Administrative agencies > Evaluation
• Verwaltung
• Verwaltungshandeln
• Evaluationsforschung
• Japan
• Gulf of Mexico
• United States
• USA

Genre/Form

• Case studies.
• Études de cas.

Bibliography (note)

• Includes bibliographical references (pages 288-307) and index.

Contents

Linking regulatory failures to organizational design -- Part I. Examining the Performance of Multiple-Purpose Regulators. Isolated effects or widespread dysfunction? -- Appealing to goal ambiguity to explain performance -- Part II. Assessing the Role of Regulatory Agency Design in the Gulf Oil Disaster. Balancing conflict and coordination at MMS -- Politics and offshore oil and gas policy -- Part III. A Theory of Multiple-Purpose Regulators. Policy context and the political choice to combine purposes -- Operations, organization, politics, and policy context -- Appendix A. Additional description and analyses for chapters 2 and 3 --Appendix B. Mathematical context, derivations, and proofs for chapter 6.

ISBN

• 9781107181694
• 1107181690
• 9781316632802
• 1316632806

LCCN

2016056417

OCLC

• ocn978349965
• 978349965
• SCSB-8785057

Owning Institutions

Princeton University Library