Research Catalog

Masters of war : military dissent and politics in the Vietnam era

Title: Masters of war : military dissent and politics in the Vietnam era / Robert Buzzanco.
Author: Buzzanco, Robert.
Publication: New York : Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Items in the Library & Off-site

Filter by

1 Item

Item details
Status	Format	Access	Call Number	Item Location
Request for On-site Use Request Scan How do I pick up this item and when will it be ready?	Text	Use in library	DS559.62.U6 B89 1996	Off-site

Details

Description

xiv, 386 pages; 24 cm

Summary

"Throughout the Vietnam War, military officials such as Matthew Ridgway, James Gavin, Maxwell Taylor, Harold K. Johnson, Wallace Greene, Victor Krulak, and John Paul Vann consistently warned against the peril of waging conventional war in Vietnam, while even advocates of U.S. involvement like William Westmoreland and Earle Wheeler recognized the political and military obstacles to American success. Within the armed forces, there was further division over the Army-devised strategy of attrition, as well as constant feuding with the White House to avoid blame for the likely failure in Indochina."--BOOK JACKET. "Masters of War convincingly disproves the claim that America's defeat was the result of a failure of will because national leaders, principally Lyndon B. Johnson, forced the troops to "fight with one hand tied behind their backs." Robert Buzzanco demonstrates that political leaders, not the military brass, pressed for war; that American policy makers always understood the problems of war in Indochina; and that civil-military acrimony and the political desire to defer responsibility for Vietnam helped draw the United States into the conflict. For the first time, these crucial issues of military dissent, interservice rivalries, and civil-military relations and politics have been tied together to provide a cogent and comprehensive analysis of the U.S. role in Vietnam: Buzzanco proves that the war was lost on the ground in Vietnam, not because of politicians or antiwar movements at home."--Jacket.

Subject

Bibliography (note)

Includes bibliographical references (p. 363-377) and index.

Contents

1. Introduction -- 2. Prologue to tragedy: US military opposition to intervention in Vietnam, 1950-1954 -- 3. Preparing for and avoiding war: military affairs and politics in Vietnam and the United States, 1955-1960 -- 4. Pinning down the president: JFK, the military, and political manoeuvering over Vietnam, January-October 1961 -- 5. The best and worst of times: the US war against Vietnam, October 1961-November 1963 -- 6. 'Seeing things through Vietnam': LBJ, the military, and the growing U.S. commitment to Vietnam, November 1963-December 1964 -- 7. Hope for the best, expect the worst: US ground troops enter the war in Vietnam, January-July 1965 -- 8. War on three fronts: US forces vs. the VC, Westmoreland vs. the marine, and the military leaders vs. the White House, July 1965-December 1966 -- 9. 'The platform of false prophets is crowded': public hope and private despair in Vietnam, 1967 -- 10. The myth of the Tet: military failure and the politics of war -- 11. Conclusion: bringing it all back home -- Epilogue -- Notes -- Bibliography.

ISBN

0521480469
9780521480468
0521599407
9780521599405

LCCN

95016226

OCLC

ocm32392578
32392578
SCSB-14471832

Owning Institutions

Princeton University Library