Research Catalog

Rules and reason : perspectives on constitutional political economy

Title: Rules and reason : perspectives on constitutional political economy / edited by Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, Giuseppe Sobbrio.
Publication: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2001.

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Status	Format	Access	Call Number	Item Location
Request for On-site Use Request Scan How do I pick up this item and when will it be ready?	Text	Use in library	HB74.P65 R85 2001	Off-site

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Additional Authors

Description

xiv, 320 pages; 24 cm

Summary

"Polarization in Western democracies and the collapse of centrally planned economies have led to calls for a redefinition of the state's core functions. This volume explores shifting conceptions of constitutional political economy anchoring the state from the viewpoints of theory, systems, and applications. It suggests why changes may be desirable and how these might be implemented. Part I addresses the writing of constitutions, the dynamic between constitutional order and civil society, the struggle between competitive and protectionist interests, the conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution, and the role of cultural explanations of constitutional development patterns. Part II explores the interplay between electoral systems and constitutional engineering, the internal costs of political coalitions, and campaigns in pluralistic elections. Part III investigates the quest for stable, dynamic federal states with particular attention to opportunities and pitfalls in Europe. With a foreword and contributions from Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan." --

Alternative Title

Rules & reason

Subject

Genre/Form

Conference papers and proceedings.

Bibliography (note)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents

Foreword / James M. Buchanan -- Constitutional issues in modern democracies / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio -- On writing a constitution / Dennis C. Mueller -- Constitutional order and economic evolution: competitive and protectionist interests in democratic Society / Viktor Vanberg -- The efficacy of arbitrary rules / James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon -- Constitutional political economy and civil society / Charles K. Rowley -- The constitutional conflict between protecting expectations and moral evolution / Nicolaus Tideman -- Ideological competition and institutions: why "cultural" explanations of development patterns are not nonsense / Michael J. Ensley and Michael C. Munger -- Electoral systems and the art of constitutional engineering: an inventory of the main findings / Bernard N. Grofman and Andrew Reynolds -- Ordinary elections and constitutional arrangements / Pierre Salmon -- The cost imposed on political coalitions by constituent parties: the case of italian national elections / Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, and Giuseppe Sobbrio -- A model of two-party campaigns in pluralistic elections with evidence / Chris W. Paul II and Allen W. Wilhite -- Ensuring a stable federal state: economics or political institutional design / Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga V. Shvetsova -- A proposal for dynamic European Federalism: FOJC / Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger -- The Maastricht "excessive deficit" rules and creative accounting / Francesco Forte -- Subsidiarity, federalism, and direct democracy as basic elements of a federal European constitution: some ideas using constitutional economics / Friedrich Schneider and Alexander F. Wagner.

ISBN

0521650577
9780521650571
0521659590
9780521659598

LCCN

99053158
9780521659598
9780521650571

OCLC

ocm42682746
42682746
SCSB-14204347

Owning Institutions

Princeton University Library