Research Catalog
Wittgenstein's account of truth
- Title
- Wittgenstein's account of truth / Sara Ellenbogen.
- Author
- Ellenbogen, Sara.
- Publication
- Albany : State University of New York Press, ©2003.
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| Status | Format | Access | Call Number | Item Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Text | Use in library | B3376.W56 .E52 2003 | Off-site |
Details
- Description
- xv, 148 pages; 23 cm.
- Summary
- Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use, " what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.
- Series Statement
- SUNY series in philosophy
- Uniform Title
- SUNY series in philosophy
- Subject
- Bibliography (note)
- Includes bibliographical references (p. 137-144) and index.
- Contents
- I: From "meaning is use" to the rejection of transcendent truth -- Wittgenstein's rejection of realism versus semantic antirealism -- The positive account of truth -- Antirealism revisited -- II: From "meaning is use" to semantic antirealism -- The acquisition argument and the manifestation criterion -- Antirealism presupposes realism -- Tensions between Wittgenstein and Dummett -- Semantic antirealism is inconsistent -- III: Why a revisionist account of truth? -- Criteria and justification conditions -- Criteria and realist truth conditions -- Why criteria are not defeasible -- Critical change, conceptual change, and their implications for the concept of truth -- Why a revisionist account of truth?
- ISBN
- 0791456250
- 9780791456255
- 0791456269
- 9780791456262
- LCCN
- 2002067041
- OCLC
- ocm49743630
- 49743630
- SCSB-9510331
- Owning Institutions
- Princeton University Library