Research Catalog
Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth : Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future
- Title
- Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth : Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future / Andrew Mumford.
- Author
- Mumford, Andrew, 1983-
- Publication
- Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, [2011]
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| Status | Format | Access | Call Number | Item Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Text | Use in library | D 101.146/14:C 83 | Off-site |
Details
- Additional Authors
- Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
- Description
- vii, 26 pages; 23 cm.
- Summary
- This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force.
- Series Statement
- Advancing strategic thought series
- Uniform Title
- Advancing strategic thought series
- Subject
- 1900-2099
- Counterinsurgency > Great Britain
- Guerrilla warfare > Great Britain
- Military doctrine > Great Britain > History > 20th century
- Military doctrine > Great Britain > History > 21st century
- Counterinsurgency
- Guerrilla warfare
- Military doctrine
- Military policy
- Aufstand
- Bekämpfung
- Upprorsbekämpning > Storbritannien
- Gerillakrigföring
- Försvarsdoktriner > Storbritannien
- counterinsurgency > UK
- Great Britain > Military policy
- Great Britain
- Großbritannien
- UK > military strategy > military doctrines > History
- Genre/Form
- History
- Note
- "September 2011."
- Bibliography (note)
- Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-26).
- Additional Formats (note)
- Also available online in PDF format from Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) web site. Adobe Acrobat Reader required.
- Contents
- Introduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience.
- ISBN
- 1584875097
- 9781584875093
- LCCN
- 2011506688
- OCLC
- ocn757348018
- 757348018
- SCSB-1615657
- Owning Institutions
- Princeton University Library